In a dramatic twist in the shifting geopolitics of Eurasia, Russia’s closest wartime allies—China and North Korea—are reportedly expanding their control over vast regions of Russian territory, particularly in the Far East.
This growing influence is not through open conquest but through a subtler and more strategic form of takeover: economic dominance, migration, and labor infiltration. As Russia continues to drain its resources in the prolonged Ukraine war, it appears to be “paying” for vital military and industrial support from its partners with pieces of its own territory and sovereignty.
The “Quiet Takeover” of Russia’s Far East
Russia’s Far Eastern territories have long been underpopulated and economically underdeveloped, making them prime targets for external influence. Over the past two years, China has quietly consolidated a strong presence across these regions under the pretext of investment and trade. Massive infrastructure projects, agricultural leases, and energy deals have turned large sections of the Russian Far East into zones of Chinese economic control.
What began as partnerships and development agreements have evolved into de facto annexations. Chinese laborers and settlers have flooded into Russian border areas, establishing self-sustaining communities that operate almost independently from local Russian governance. Mandarin is now more commonly heard in markets and construction sites than Russian, and local authorities increasingly rely on Chinese companies for basic services and development funding.
At the same time, North Korea has been using its manpower as leverage. Tens of thousands of North Korean laborers have been relocated to Russia’s eastern territories to work in logging, mining, and construction industries. These workers are sent under state contracts, with most of their wages siphoned off by Pyongyang in exchange for military and logistical assistance to Moscow. In practice, this has created entire districts run by North Korean administrators, where Russian oversight is virtually absent.
Russia’s Desperation and Strategic Dependence
For Moscow, the Ukraine war has become an all-consuming conflict that has drained its economy, manpower, and resources. Under heavy international sanctions, Russia faces isolation from Western markets and critical supply chains. To sustain its military operations, the Kremlin has increasingly turned to its few remaining allies—China and North Korea—for weapons, ammunition, and economic relief.
China has provided industrial goods, vehicles, dual-use technologies, and critical financial backing that have kept parts of Russia’s war machine operational. In exchange, Beijing has received vast natural resource concessions, energy contracts on favorable terms, and exclusive access to mining rights in Siberia and the Far East. In some cases, Russia has even permitted long-term Chinese “leases” of agricultural and industrial land that effectively grant Beijing control over these regions for decades.
Meanwhile, North Korea has emerged as a critical supplier of artillery shells, rockets, and even soldiers. Thousands of North Korean troops have reportedly been deployed in support roles along Russia’s western borders and industrial zones. In return, Moscow has provided Pyongyang with much-needed fuel, food, and military technology, including advanced missile and air-defense components.
These exchanges, while mutually beneficial in the short term, have come at an immense cost to Russian sovereignty. The Kremlin’s increasing reliance on foreign support has reduced its bargaining power, effectively forcing it to offer its own land and influence as collateral.
A Transaction Paid in Territory
The term “territorial payment” may sound symbolic, but on the ground, it reflects a genuine shift in control. In the Russian Far East, Chinese firms now control entire urban zones through “development enclaves” that operate with their own laws, security, and administration. Russian citizens, facing poverty and emigration, are increasingly outnumbered by Chinese and North Korean workers. Local businesses trade in yuan, not rubles, and Chinese banks dominate the financial transactions of the region.
North Korean presence is smaller but more militarized. Their workers, often housed in isolated camps, are guarded by North Korean supervisors and answer directly to Pyongyang’s Ministry of People’s Security. In some frontier regions, North Korean military engineers are reported to be constructing logistics bases, which may later serve dual-use purposes — both for trade and defense.
This phenomenon represents not only an economic transformation but a slow, creeping erosion of Russian control. With every new agreement, Russia’s Far East is becoming less Russian — a pawn sacrificed by the Kremlin to sustain its geopolitical ambitions elsewhere.
Strategic Implications for the Region
The quiet expansion of Chinese and North Korean influence within Russia’s borders marks a profound realignment in Eurasian power dynamics. For China, this development serves multiple purposes: securing access to vast natural resources, establishing a buffer zone near the Pacific, and extending its influence toward the Arctic routes. It transforms Beijing from a regional power into a dominant land power across northern Asia.
For North Korea, the benefits are both economic and strategic. The arrangement provides Pyongyang with access to hard currency, food, and energy while deepening its military cooperation with Moscow. It also strengthens Kim Jong Un’s regional standing, as his regime now plays a key role in sustaining one of the world’s most powerful militaries.
For Russia, however, the consequences are dire. What began as a strategy to outlast Western pressure has evolved into a trap of dependency. The Kremlin has traded pieces of its sovereignty for short-term survival, allowing two smaller yet ambitious neighbors to carve influence from within its own borders. The symbolism is stark — a nation that once prided itself on defending territorial integrity is now paying for its war with fragments of that very territory.
The emerging reality is that Russia’s alliance with China and North Korea is no longer one of equals. Moscow’s desperation has turned it into the junior partner in a triad it once thought it could dominate. As Chinese investments and North Korean labor embed themselves deeper into Russian soil, the Kremlin’s hold over its eastern territories weakens day by day.
In effect, Russia is waging two wars — one in Ukraine, and another, quieter one, within its own borders. The first is fought with tanks and missiles; the second, with contracts, trade, and migration. And in this second war, it appears Moscow is already losing — not to invasion, but to its own dependence.
