“It is unwise to harm those on whom you are dependent, for without them you would struggle to survive”- Moldova should’ve read and imbibed this unknown philosopher’s saying. But it chose not to.
Moldova was an early beneficiary of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost, permitting political pluralism at the regional (republican) level. Then everything became unhinged across its most Russian-speaking territory. Loyalties were sorely divided, and old blood loyalties to the Russian motherland ran deep. In the Moldovan SSR, like many other parts of the Soviet Union, national movements proliferated. In time, these forces enhanced underlying impulses to leave the USSR in favor of uniting with Romania. This spawned a counter-blast from the primarily Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who predominated in areas like Transnistria. The change was gradual but occasionally violent.
In August 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR made Moldovan the official language, recognized a linguistic Moldavian-Romanian identity, and the Romanian Latin alphabet in the Moldovan language. In 1990, the words Soviet and Socialist were replaced with “Republic of Moldova”. Transnistria’s strange breakaway status crystallized by the power struggles of an increasingly bipolar world order, malingered on with three solitary friends (apart, of course, from Big Uncle Moscow) – namely the three other mostly unrecognized breakaway states: Abkhazia, Artsakh, and South Ossetia.
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The toppling of the Ceaușescu regime in Romania in December 1989 and re-opening the border between Romania and Moldova on 6 May 1990 led many in Transnistria and Moldova to believe that a union between Moldova and Romania was inevitable . With the fall of Communist Party rule, Romania appeared much more attractive. This, unfortunately, alarmed the Russian-speaking population, spawned secessionist movements in Gagauzia and Transnistria, and as the nationalist-dominated Moldovan Supreme Soviet outlawed these initiatives, the Gagauz Republic and Transnistria declared independence from Moldova. They sought re-alignment with the Soviet Union as independent federal republics, and of course, Moscow’s assistance was bountiful. Transnistria thus became one of numerous “unrecognised republics” in the USSR, alongside Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. These self-proclaimed states maintained close ties with each other and are mainly dependent on Russian sponsorship.
After the Soviet coup attempt of 1991, the Moldovan parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova. It sought to assert its sovereignty over the entire territory of the now-former MSSR. Tensions erupted in Transnistria. On 5 April 1992, Vice-President Rutskoy of Russia told 5,000 people assembled in Tiraspol that “Transnistrians should demand independence”. The first fatalities in the emerging conflict occurred on 2 November 1990, two months after the PMR’s 2 September 1990 declaration of independence. Moldovan forces entered Dubăsari to break Transnistria into two halves but were stopped by the city’s inhabitants, who occupied the Dniester bridge. A second Moldovan attempt to cross the Lunga bridge took place on 13 December 1991. After this second failed attempt, there was a lull in military activity until 2 March 1992, considering the beginning of the War of Transnistria. Moldova was admitted as a member of the United Nations on August 27, 1991, after its formal declaration of independence. The armed conflict lasted until 21 July 1992, in three areas along the Dniester river. The cold conflict was briefly hot.
A ceasefire agreement was signed on 21 July. This official document, whose details were primarily dictated by Moscow, was signed by the presidents of Russia (Boris Yeltsin) and Moldova (Mircea Snegur). The agreement provided for peacekeeping forces to observe the ceasefire involving Russian, Moldovan, and PMR battalions under the orders of a joint military command structure, the Joint Control Commission (JCC)
The resulting pro-Russia breakaway region of Transnistria is a narrow strip of land almost 200 kilometers (120 miles) long and 30 kilometres wide between the Dniester River and Moldova’s eastern border with Ukraine. It split from Moldova in 1992 but is not recognized as a sovereign state by the international community or, indeed, even by Russia.
The territory occupied by the Transnistrian independent authority is located within the internationally recognized borders of Moldova. The Transnistrians are primarily supported by the Russian Federation. For all intents and purposes, it is “Little Russia,” a fact which is reflected in the import and export of all significant non-perishable goods. Although Transnistria continues to fall under Moldovan jurisdiction, life in the territory is regulated by the legislation adopted by the secessionist authorities and is solidly Russian speaking. Moldovan legislation is neither practically effective nor statutorily enforced in Transnistria.
Compounded effects of the Russo-Ukraine war:
To be clear, the Russo-Ukraine war has navigated such paths that the war isn’t limited to Ukraine’s territorial boundaries. There may also be other unintended consequences of the war in Ukraine. One of the most important would be the resolution of the Transnistria conflict in Moldova. Putin hasn’t given up the side to capture Ukraine’s Black Sea space all the way upto Odessa/Transnistria and Moldova
Recently , President Vladimir Putin revoked a 2012 decree that in part underpinned Moldova’s sovereignty in resolving the future of the Transnistria region.
The decree, which included a Moldova component, outlined Russia’s foreign policy 11 years ago which assumed Moscow’s closer relations with the European Union and the United States.
However, thanks to the Moldovan attitude towards Russia following its military action in Ukraine has left the Kremlin with no choice but to act.
The order revoking the 2012 document was published on the Kremlin’s website and states that the decision was taken to “ensure the national interests of Russia in connection with the profound changes taking place in international relations”.
The decree committed Russia to seeking ways to resolve the separatist issue “based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova in determining the special status of Transnistria”. Here the word neutral is important for your perusal. Moldova has abandoned its neutral status in the ongoing Ukraine war and thus, it practically bit the hand that fed it.
As President Putin cancels Russia’s 2012 positioning towards the Transnistrian conflict settlement, Moldova said it will ‘carefully’ analyse Moscow’s new concept.
Political analyst and former Moldovan ambassador to Russia Anatol Taranu said that after President Putin abrogated this Russian commitment, it opened the way for Russian actions no longer to be limited by international bonds, “which would mean that, potentially, Russia could even recognise the independence of Transnistria”, said Taranu.
Moldova’s own mishappenings:
To be honest, though, this was prophesied. You see, the Moldovan management has lost its test of devotion to the King in the East, and is now forced to deal with the worst possible financial collapse. Nearly all of the European countries have surely experienced a shift in dynamics as a result of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, while those that have a soft spot for Moscow have benefited better than those that have opposed it. Unfortunately, Moldova belonged to the latter group, and its leadership has caused the suffering of its citizens.
Moldova faces soaring inflation and has struggled to cope with an influx of Ukrainian refugees. It has also suffered power cuts after Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities and struggled to end its reliance on Russian gas.
The steep price increases, particularly for Russian gas, led to street protests last year in which demonstrators called for the government and President Sandu to resign. The recent fall of the Moldovan government is evidence of the same.
Russia has always been an important player in Moldova’s strategic interests. While President Putin has so far abstained from expressing animosity towards Moldova’s pro-EU administration, there are still many vulnerabilities that Moscow might use further if it chose to sow chaos. Not only is Moldova’s economy vulnerable and reliant on Russian energy, but there are also political groups and regions over which Moscow wields varying degrees of power. The recent change of law on Russia’s part relative to the Transnistria region should be seen in this light.
