![A view of destruction at UNRWA headquarters, which provides aid to millions of Palestinians and works under the United Nations, is targeted by Israel in Gaza City, Gaza on February 11, 2024. [Karam Hassan - Anadolu Agency] A view of destruction at UNRWA headquarters, which provides aid to millions of Palestinians and works under the United Nations, is targeted by Israel in Gaza City, Gaza on February 11, 2024](https://tfiglobalnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/unrwa.jpg)
In a revealing discovery from documents archived in Britain’s National Archive, it has come to light that the wealthiest Arab states declined assistance to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) during a significant financial crisis in the late 1970s. Despite explicit warnings regarding the potential severe consequences of the agency’s collapse, these affluent Arab nations chose not to contribute. The communication records between UNRWA and Western and Arab countries during this period reinforce the prevailing belief that UNRWA’s mission was primarily conceived to address political rather than humanitarian concerns.
Established in 1950 under the United Nations mandate, UNRWA initially aimed to provide temporary relief to Palestinian refugees by offering essential provisions, housing, education, and health services. While the occupied Palestinian territories faced by Israel represented a focal point, the primary concentrations of registered Palestinian refugees with UNRWA were, and continue to be, in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
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UNRWA’s financial stability has historically relied heavily on voluntary contributions from UN member states and NGOs, rendering the agency vulnerable to crises. By the conclusion of 1979, UNRWA found itself amidst a severe financial downturn, jeopardizing services for Palestinian refugees in occupied territories and neighboring nations, notably the entire school system.
Compounding these challenges, ongoing issues in southern Lebanon disrupted UNRWA’s refugee operations, affecting over 50,000 Palestinians displaced due to Israeli military actions. Reports from UNRWA indicated its provision of essential services to approximately 1.8 million registered refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, with a projected deficit of $53 million in the 1980 budget.
To address this crisis, then Commissioner-General Olof Rydbeck embarked on urgent diplomatic missions to countries such as the US, the UK, and Jordan, aiming to secure financial support. Notably, attempts to garner support from Saudi Arabia proved unsuccessful. In 1979, Arab oil-producing countries contributed $10.01 million, a mere 1.2% of UNRWA’s budget, while the US and Canada donated $56.3 million (30.3%) and the European Economic Community, along with Norway and Sweden, contributed $53.8 million (33%).
The British Embassy in Jordan alerted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the precarious nature of UNRWA’s funding, characterizing it as an “annual cliff-hanger.”
In an early January 1980 report dispatched to London, British Ambassador Alan Urwick highlighted key concerns based on discussions with the Jordanian government and UNRWA officials. Notably, Arab oil producers’ reluctance to augment their modest contributions to the budget had irked Western donors, dissuading the UN Secretary-General from further efforts to seek additional funding from them.
Despite affirming the accuracy of UNRWA’s reports, Urwick warned that issues in refugee camps could swiftly permeate the broader population. He argued for the agency’s vital role in maintaining stability in Jordan, asserting that its continuity was strongly in the interest of concerned parties.
In early February, UNRWA’s Commissioner-General, Olof Rydbeck, conveyed to Urwick the challenges in resolving the financial crisis. Rydbeck revealed Yasser Arafat’s promise to intervene on UNRWA’s behalf in Arab capitals, but Arafat’s preoccupation with Lebanon hindered fulfillment. Discussions between Urwick and Rydbeck, following talks with Jordanian authorities and visits to the USA and Scandinavia, preceded the Commissioner-General’s London visit. Rydbeck conveyed Arab governments’ stance that the refugee situation was not their creation, emphasizing their reluctance to assume UNRWA’s main burden. Rydbeck urged them to provide additional funds to sustain the agency’s operations.
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In a separate report from the British Embassy in Vienna, where the UNRWA headquarters was located, confirmation was provided regarding the reluctance of Arab oil-producing states to augment their regular share by more than $2.2 million in the 1980 budget. UNRWA’s Deputy Commissioner-General, Alan Brown, communicated to the embassy that the wealthy Arab states’ stance emanated from their historical perspective, asserting that the responsibility for Palestine refugees rested with the West. Their apprehension was rooted in the fear that a prolonged commitment might eventually burden them with the primary responsibility for sustaining UNRWA.
Despite the steadfast position of Arab states, Brown expressed the long-term objective of persuading them to bear approximately 30% of UNRWA’s operational costs, akin to the contributions from North American and European counterparts. The remaining 10% would ideally be covered by other donor governments and organizations.
Furthermore, documents revealed Syria’s strongly negative stance on UNRWA’s financial challenges. During discussions with a Council of Europe delegation, the Syrian Minister of Social Affairs and the Director-General of Refugee Affairs in the Interior Ministry contended that a deficit existed, emphasizing that wealthier Western countries, particularly the USA, should assume financial responsibility.
The Saudis declined UNRWA Commissioner-General Rydbeck’s request for a visit to Riyadh. Rydbeck, seeking Saudi support akin to their contributions in 1979 alongside Kuwait and Libya, aimed to sustain 290 junior schools for Palestinian refugees.
According to the British ambassador in Amman, Jordan’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Marwan AlQassem, reported that Saudi Arabia held a negative stance on UNRWA issues. The Saudis reiterated their belief that this was a UN responsibility, not an Arab problem, cautioning against using it to pressure Jordan. Despite acknowledging the challenge in countering the Saudi position, Jordan perceived the Saudis as contributing generously to other UN agencies, even if their support for UNRWA was relatively modest.
Before the visit of the top UNRWA official to London to discuss funding, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) within the FCO recommended the UK’s continued support for the agency. In a “restricted” report, indicating limited access, the ODA emphasized that the substantial support provided was driven not only by humanitarian concerns but also by the recognition that a collapse of the agency would carry significant political consequences.
The report underscored that British interests in the region would be adversely affected, particularly damaging relations with the Arab nations. It highlighted the potential threat to stability in Jordan and Lebanon if UNRWA were to cease operations.
An inter-departmental memo from the Ministry of Overseas Development further cautioned that if UNRWA faced funding-related collapse, the Arab world would turn to the international community, necessitating the search for an alternative and potentially more costly arrangement. The ministry stressed the UK’s prioritization of supporting UNRWA due to the anticipated serious political repercussions, emphasizing the risk of strained relations with the Arab world and the potential destabilization of Jordan, which still harbored a significant Palestinian population, and the precarious situation in Lebanon.
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In a meeting with Douglas Hurd, the Minister of State for Europe in London, Rydbeck underscored UNRWA’s crucial political role over the past 30 years. He cautioned the British that any adverse developments due to recurring financial troubles could introduce an element of instability to the region.
In discussions, Commissioner-General Rydbeck underscored his primary concern regarding the potential impact of the UNRWA financial crisis on Palestinian education programs. “The effect if they had to dismantle the schools would be considerable,” he noted, since UNRWA “was regarded as the Palestinian Education Department.” Indeed, “No population valued education so highly since the Palestinians saw it as important for the future of their people.”
UNRWA’s records for 1980 revealed budget allocations of $99.5 million for education, $29.7 million for health, and $56.9 million for relief services. Despite the looming risks associated with UNRWA’s collapse, British ministers conveyed their inability to exceed a contribution of $10.2 million, falling short of the $11 million that the agency sought from Britain.
To cope with the financial crisis in 1980, UNRWA implemented cost-cutting measures and reduced certain services. Additionally, the agency received some contributions from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The collective efforts aimed to mitigate the challenges posed by the funding shortfall and sustain essential programs, particularly in the critical realm of Palestinian education.
In conclusion, the revelations from the documents archived in Britain’s National Archive shed light on the challenging financial crisis faced by the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the late 1970s. The wealthy Arab states, despite warnings of severe consequences, chose not to provide assistance, emphasizing a perception that UNRWA’s mission was more politically motivated than humanitarian.
