Can Russia RULE Ukraine?

The notion propagated by certain sectors of Western media that Russia would struggle to maintain control over Ukraine, should it emerge victorious in the conflict, warrants a closer examination. The assertion frequently made is that the burdensome costs associated with governing a large and resistant population would render any such victory futile, ultimately dooming Russia to a long-term defeat due to the impracticality of pacifying Ukraine. However, this perspective might not entirely capture the complexity of the situation.

Historically, there is scant evidence to support the inevitability of a failed Russian occupation of Ukraine. Drawing parallels, the Soviet era provides an illustrative precedent, where Moscow managed to sustain governance over its vast empire, even in the face of widespread unpopularity.

Further analysis reveals that economic gains from new resources, markets, and tax revenues could significantly bolster Russia’s financial position. Additionally, the apparent war weariness among Ukrainian men, as indicated by widespread draft evasion, could reduce the pool of potential insurgents, thereby stabilizing the region in future years.

Moreover, there remains a substantial segment of the Ukrainian populace with pro-Russian sentiments, particularly in the eastern and southern regions. These groups could provide a critical foundation for a civilian administration under Russian control, facilitating the integration and long-term stabilization of these areas under Moscow’s influence.

Plans to encourage Russian migration to strategic locations such as Kiev aim to adjust the demographic balance, promoting deeper societal integration through shared cultural and social practices, a method historically observed in the mingling of Ukrainian and Russian communities through marriage and communal life.

Russia’s recent administrative successes further underscore its capability to govern contested regions effectively. Post-civil war Chechnya has been transformed into a supportive region, contributing troops for Russia’s operations. Similarly, Crimea has seen a decade of stable governance under Russian control, and the relative calm in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions since their capture in 2014 provides a contrast to their more turbulent surroundings.

Recent developments in regions like eastern Kherson and southern Zaporizhzhia suggest a minimal resistance to Russian control, indicating a smoother transition than anticipated by many Western commentators. Economic activities are persevering, and significant portions of the local authorities have aligned with Russia, ensuring continuity in governance. This pragmatic approach of not dismissing former local officials has facilitated a more stable administrative transition, avoiding the errors made by the U.S. in Iraq where the exclusion of Baath Party members led to administrative vacuum and chaos.

The comparisons often drawn with Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq might seem pertinent but miss crucial contextual differences. In those instances, the occupying forces were extending their reach, using these countries as strategic bases, which ultimately proved unsustainable. Ukraine, by contrast, shares a substantial pro-Russian sentiment in parts of its territory, unlike the prevalent anti-American sentiments in Vietnam and Afghanistan. This cultural and political affinity could underpin a more stable integration process.

Moreover, the strategic imperatives for Russia regarding Ukraine differ significantly from those of the U.S. in distant conflicts. Ukraine is not just a neighboring state but a buffer zone against NATO, making it a vital interest for Moscow. This geographical and strategic proximity means that the costs and logistics of maintaining control are considerably different from American or Soviet experiences in distant lands.

While skeptics in the media argue that the Ukrainian resistance and external support could disrupt Russian control, it’s essential to recognize that no definitive evidence suggests an inevitable failure of Russian governance post-conflict. If Russia succeeds in consolidating control over Ukraine, it could potentially leverage the country’s resources, manpower, and strategic position to enhance its long-term economic and military stature. The experience of managing a large-scale conflict could also provide Russia with valuable military insights that Western powers haven’t encountered recently.

The prevailing narrative that Russia cannot possibly benefit from its actions in Ukraine needs a more nuanced examination. Acknowledging the potential for a successful Russian administration in Ukraine could lead to a more balanced and informed discussion about the future dynamics of the region. This isn’t to downplay the challenges involved, but to suggest that outright dismissal of Russian capabilities may overlook significant strategic calculations and historical precedents.

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