The Chinese Communist Party is a divided house, and many are not happy with how Xi Jinping is leading the country. First the pandemic, then an expansionist approach, and now with the economic and industrial catastrophe, CCP is witnessing an all-out game of thrones.
Following the revelation, last month by the semi-official NetEase and Sohu websites that several senior officials in the political-legal apparatus (zheng fa xitong), which includes the police, the secret police, and the courts, had plotted “sinister and treacherous” (bugui) actions against a top party leader, generally thought to be Xi, not-so-subtle instances of in-fighting among these influential figures and their cliques have emerged.
Xi, who has not visited overseas in about two years, appears to be preoccupied with dealing with various difficulties as he prepares for the 20th Party Congress next year, the focus of which is likely to be the confirmation of the strongman as the party’s “core for life.” However, critics have started to mount and people are showing their concerns and anger in many different ways.
Read more: The CCP foils an attempt on Xi’s life as power struggle intensifies within the party
Over the past year, there have been attempts on Xi Jinping’s life. The power struggle within the CCP has become so intense now that the Central Disciplinary Commission (CDC), admitted publicly that there was a plot against Xi. On September 13, two major news portals in China published the same article that recapped a CDC “morning brief,” which disclosed that a “sinister gang” within the public security bureau tried to attempt Xi’s life.
Wang Qishan and his buck in the game
Hu Shuli, the founder and editor of the liberal online magazine Caixin.com, posted the following remark in the cuisine section of the news outlet’s We-chat account earlier this month regarding a specific “pighead.” Xi is known by several nicknames, including “Pighead.” The inclusion of “strategic partnership” appears to be a sleight-of-hand indictment of Xi’s persistent conservatism and failure to create meaningful links with Western countries, even though this blog is supposed to be about food.
During Xi’s first term, Wang Qishan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) – the party’s leading anti-graft organisation – provided her with “protection” (2012-2017). Many believe Wang to be one of Xi’s closest allies; he was appointed Vice-President in 2013, and he was once Xi’s key adviser on US relations. Since departing the Politburo in 2017, Wang, on the other hand, has rapidly lost favour with the supreme commander.
Former CCDI officer Dong Hong, a close associate of Wang’s, was jailed in April for theft and a “degenerate lifestyle.” When Wang was the CCDI’s party secretary, Dong, a vice-ministerial-level cadre, was Wang’s, right-hand man. Dong was the leader of a committee formed by the CCDI in 2013 to look into allegations of corruption in provincial and government agencies. He was charged with “seriously violating political discipline and political regulation,” as well as “betraying the party.” Defying “political discipline and political regulation” is a euphemism for not being loyal enough to the party’s “core,” according to President Xi.
Xi’s brute approach and pushback from within CCP
The power struggle between Xi and former PBSC member and Vice President Zeng Qinghong is much more evident. Zeng, a princeling and close assistant to former President Jiang Zemin, is a key figure in the Shanghai Faction. Zeng is thought to be the “protective umbrella” for several multibillion-dollar businesses. Fantasia Holdings, which is run by his niece Zeng Baobao, is one of these businesses. Rating agencies have reduced Fantasia to “default” status due to its failure to pay interest on bonds and promissory notes. Fantasia had nearly 50 billion yuan ($7.5 billion) in current liabilities as of the middle of this year. Current liabilities are those that must be repaid within a year.
Xi’s unreasonable purges
Xi’s long-standing distrust of the political-legal (zheng fa) apparatus stems from the fact that his arch-enemy, former PBSC member and internal security czar Zhou Yongkang, who was sentenced to life in prison in 2015, still has a sizable following and underlings in the police, secret police, and judicial system. This is the motivation behind Xi’s multi-year zheng fa system cleanse.
In numerous speeches, Xi has tied his power as “party core” to his ability to carry out the party’s “self-purification and self-renewal.” His ability to bring down a huge number of “tigers,” or senior cadres, for economic crimes and disciplinary issues is part of his reputation. His competition with Zeng Qinghong and Wang Qishan has mostly taken the form of verbal innuendoes so far. Xinhua and People’s Daily, for example, have published a series of editorials stating that the anti-corruption effort will not allow any “Iron Head Princes.”
One of the titles given to top noblemen by Qing Dynasty monarchs was “Iron Head Prince,” which is said to be an allusion to Zeng Qinghong. Because the last Iron Head Prince was known as Prince Qing, this is the case. These verbal communications and intimidations are followed by targeted actions on Xi’s rival’s proteges.
Going ahead it will be interesting to see how these established CCP elders and leaders can save their skin and their proteges from Xi Jinping and on top of that, how they can mitigate these losses.
