When President Xi Jinping was seen welcoming Prime Minister Modi in Tianjin, these photographs were not just significant for their respective countries but for Asia and even the entire world. However, what is shocking is the apparent reason that has triggered this camaraderie.
The New York Times, in a report, has suggested that the real reason behind the ongoing India–U.S. tensions was not New Delhi’s purchase of Russian oil, but rather Prime Minister Modi’s refusal to nominate Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, which resulted in a falling out that has pushed India closer to its BRICS partners.
There are many reasons to take this report seriously, especially when Trump continues to adopt a strange soft stance towards China and the European countries, which purchase far more oil and gas from Russia than India ever has. Something all three parties have been doing for some time. So what has triggered these sudden tariff waves from Washington?
Perhaps the world should thank Donald Trump for these Modi–Xi photographs. Whether or not he succeeded in bringing peace between India and Pakistan, he does appear to have pushed India and China closer together.
For the United States, countering China’s growing dominance in the Indo-Pacific made India the obvious strategic partner. The two countries had advanced their ties on this very basis: from the Quad to American companies shifting operations to India, everything fit into that narrative.
But now that the “dragon and the elephant” are signaling a willingness to work together in this region, not only the relevance of the Quad but also Washington’s larger strategy of containing China seems to be in question. Perhaps that is why Donald Trump has even refused to attend the upcoming Quad Summit in India.
Does this mean that a partnership, crucial to the present world order and ostensibly built on mutual trust, is now faltering simply because the current U.S. President wants, like Barack Obama before him, to win the Nobel Peace Prize, even if it comes at the cost of sacrificing the world’s largest democracy and a longstanding friend?
Trump calls tariffs the most beautiful thing, and yet the irony is hard to miss: his latest tariffs may have compelled India and China to take their first real step toward reconciliation since the bloody Galwan clash of 2020. If photographs could speak, the caption beneath that smiling image of Modi and Xi in Tianjin would surely read: “Thank you, Mr. Trump—sincerely, Asia.”
In Foreign Policy, Nothing Is Permanent Except Self-Interest
Seven years after his last visit, Modi’s setting foot on Chinese soil underscores the fact that in the complex realm of diplomacy, it is not relationships but interests that endure.
The deadly clash in Galwan in June 2020 had pushed relations between India and China to their lowest point in decades, deepening mistrust not only between the two leaderships but also among their peoples. Yet in Tianjin in 2024, the picture looked different.
Modi and Xi sat face to face for an hour-long meeting, in which the discussion went well beyond restoring direct flights or resuming cultural relations. It touched upon strategic coordination itself. Both leaders used terms like “mutual trust and sensitivity”—phrases unheard of in recent years. Xi spoke of a long-term vision, while Modi advocated for the benefits of the 2.8 billion people their nations represent.
This is not just diplomacy; it is a glimpse of a new world order taking shape. But who is the true director of this drama? Perhaps Trump and his tangled tariff policy.
Washington’s latest move—a 50% tariff on Indian goods—was meant to bind India more firmly into the Western camp. The effect was the opposite. Seizing the moment, China swiftly aligned itself with India. Beijing denounced the tariffs as U.S. bullying and promised to stand firmly by India in the face of this Western strong-arming.
Why Has the SCO Suddenly Begun to Look Relevant?
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin became the perfect stage for this unusual closeness. Long derided in Western capitals as little more than a “talk shop,” the SCO suddenly looks consequential. With members like China, Russia, India, Iran, and the Central Asian states—and partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey—the grouping now represents 40% of the world’s population and a vast share of its energy resources.
For Xi Jinping, the summit was a golden opportunity to showcase China as a pole of an alternative world order, and by standing alongside Modi and Putin, he cashed in on it. For Prime Minister Modi, too, the timing could not have been better. Rather than responding to tariffs with tit-for-tat measures, he deepened his image as a pragmatic leader by attending the SCO summit. His presence sent a clear message to Washington: the world’s largest democracy, and its most populous nation, is not a pawn on America’s chessboard.
American strategists for a long time have viewed India as Asia’s democratic giant, the “counterweight” to China. Billions of dollars in defense deals, endless talk of the Indo-Pacific, countless Quad meetings—all reinforced the belief that India was firmly in the U.S. camp. And now, Modi and Xi meet in Tianjin. Washington will not digest this picture easily.
For decades, Indian and Chinese leaders have spoken in metaphors about the “dance of the elephant and the dragon.” In Tianjin, those metaphors returned. Both sides spoke of long-term vision, Asian peace, and multipolarity. The language may have been boilerplate diplomacy, but the symbolism mattered.
Because here is the truth: if India and China ever learn not to resolve but to manage their rivalry, it would be enough to shake the existing world order. Washington would lose its ability to play the two Asian giants off against each other. The Russia–India–China (RIC) format could be on the rise, creating a coalition with the capacity to rewrite the rules of global governance.
Of course, China and India have had tense relations and clashes, but they are two historic civilizations. And when historians look back on the current times, they may conclude that the new Asian equation began not in Beijing or New Delhi, but in Washington—with the tariff decree of an American president in a headless pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize.
