More than 100 Chinese warships and coastguard vessels have fanned out across the western Pacific and South China Sea. Beijing has announced no drill. Yet analysts suspect the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rehearsing how to keep US forces out of a Taiwan conflict. The pattern fits a strategy Beijing has built for decades. Its goal is simple: stop American help from reaching the island in time.
What is the PLA doing right now?
Taiwan’s National Security Council chief, Joseph Wu, flagged the build-up on 3 November. He reported over 100 Chinese navy and coastguard ships in the western Pacific. The US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) then identified two clusters. One ring of warships and coastguard vessels hugged Taiwan. Four naval task forces sat farther out, between Taiwan and Guam.
Ships from three PLA theatre commands took part, a rare level of coordination. The Liaoning carrier group entered the western Pacific in late October. The newer carrier Fujian left Sanya, on Hainan Island, on 2 November. The ISW judged the deployment larger than last December’s Justice Mission 2025 drill. Taiwan has described the manoeuvres as “area denial” exercises.
How does the PLA plan to keep US forces out?
Geography holds the key. A string of islands runs from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Strategists call it the “first island chain”. A second chain lies farther east and takes in Guam. US reinforcements would cross the waters between the two.
The PLA wants to turn that stretch of ocean into a no-go zone. Analysts expect PLA warships east of Taiwan to hunt US submarines, surface ships and aircraft in a war.
Missiles do much of the heavy lifting. China’s DF-26 can strike land targets and aircraft carriers at sea. The US Defense Intelligence Agency chief told Congress that China added 50 DF-26s in 2025. That took the stockpile to 550. Its range of nearly 2,500 miles (about 4,000km) puts Guam within reach.
The Pentagon’s latest China report reckons such strikes could work 1,500 to 2,000 nautical miles from the mainland. It also believes Chinese over-the-horizon radars can probably spot ships and aircraft between the two island chains.
What strategy will China follow?
Chinese military doctrine calls the approach “counter-intervention“. Western planners use the label anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD. The idea is plain. China does not need to sink the US Navy. It needs to push American ships and aircraft far from Taiwan.
Distance buys time. A distant US fleet would struggle to break a blockade or blunt an invasion. Meanwhile, the PLA could isolate the island by sea and air.
Psychology matters too. The ISW believes the deployments aim to erode Taiwan’s faith in US support. Silence may serve a purpose as well. Skipping an announcement may make such operations look routine. It may also show the PLA can switch from peacetime to combat at speed.
How is China militarising the South China Sea?
The South China Sea forms the southern flank of this plan. By 2016, China had turned seven Spratly reefs into artificial islands. In 2015, Xi Jinping said China did not intend to militarise them.
Three years later, China reportedly placed YJ-12B anti-ship missiles and HQ-9B air-defence missiles on three reefs. Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief now carry 9,000-foot runways. Their hangars can shelter 72 aircraft.
Now the build-up has moved north. In October 2025, China began dredging Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands. It marked Beijing’s first major island-building since 2017. The new island covers about 1,490 acres, almost matching Mischief Reef. Its shape could fit another 9,000-foot runway.
Satellite images from July showed the first phase complete. Antelope sits about 162 nautical miles from Sanya, the port the Fujian sailed from this month. Analysts link the northern South China Sea directly to any Taiwan war. Some think the new island could complicate US submarine patrols. It could also help shield China’s nuclear-armed submarines. Beijing insists the work serves civilian needs, such as weather forecasting.
Has China built an impregnable fortress?
Not quite. The islands give China radar cover, airstrips and missile batteries far from its coast. Yet they cannot move or hide. A Chinese military magazine once warned these bases would struggle to survive attack in a war. Distance from the mainland also makes resupply hard under fire.
Their real value may lie in peacetime. They let China watch, patrol and pressure rivals every day.
What happens next?
Beijing has not explained the latest deployments. In March, US intelligence agencies judged that China has no fixed timeline for taking Taiwan. They also concluded Chinese leaders do not plan an invasion in 2027.
Still, each exercise sharpens the PLA’s ability to shut the door on outside help. Taiwan also holds local elections later this month. For Washington and its allies, the road to Taiwan keeps getting longer and more dangerous.
