Benjamin Netanyahu wants Israeli jets over Yemen, flying alongside Saudi Arabia’s. He is pressing Riyadh, through American mediators, for permission to join the fight against the Houthis. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman opposes the idea, fearing a public backlash at home.
The request follows a brutal weekend for the kingdom. On 10 October, a Houthi missile hit King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, killing 13 people and wounding more than 300. Saudi stocks of Patriot interceptors are now running short.
So why does Israel want to join Riyadh’s war? Security, trade, diplomacy and domestic politics all play a part.
What is happening in Yemen?
Yemen’s war never truly ended. A Saudi-Houthi truce largely held from 2022 until this summer, when the Houthis tore it up in July and declared a naval blockade of the kingdom. In September, they captured the Red Sea port of Mocha after days of fighting, then seized islands near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the narrow channel joining the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
That strait matters more than ever. The war with Iran has effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, so Saudi Arabia has leaned heavily on Yanbu, its Red Sea export terminal. The Houthis now hold a knife to that artery. Iran’s hand shows too: Tehran, by several accounts, ordered the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and promised fresh money and weapons.
Why does Israel want to join?
The Houthis have fired missiles and drones at Israel since late 2023, and resumed those attacks during this year’s Iran war. Israel hit back repeatedly between May and October 2025, but the raids never broke the movement.
The Houthis have crippled Israel’s only Red Sea port, which now handles roughly one ship a month. Port managers expect the slump to last at least another three years, and Houthi control of Bab al-Mandab would make the closure permanent in practice.
This motive outweighs the rest. Normalisation with Saudi Arabia remains Netanyahu’s great unfinished foreign-policy project. Riyadh demands a credible path to a Palestinian state first, while Netanyahu has vowed on the campaign trail to block one. A shared war offers a way around the deadlock, since joint combat builds trust that summits rarely achieve. By most accounts, Israel already passes Houthi intelligence to Riyadh through US Central Command (CENTCOM), and Netanyahu now wants to turn that quiet channel into an open partnership. Washington adds its own incentive: Donald Trump has tied a US-Saudi civil nuclear deal to Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords.
Washington wants no new Middle Eastern war before its November midterms, and American officials have even asked Israel’s military chief whether the IDF could strike Yemen. Riyadh’s other partners have hesitated too: Pakistan, despite a new defence pact with Riyadh and Ankara, has discussed no military response. Israel wants Gulf rulers to draw an obvious lesson: when missiles fly, Israel turns up.
Why does Israel need a Saudi nod?
Israel has bombed Yemen alone before, so why ask now? Geography supplies part of the answer. Yemen lies roughly 2,000 kilometres from Israel, so long-range raids demand aerial refuelling and careful routing down the Red Sea. Saudi airspace would shorten those routes considerably. Saudi jets already pound Yemen, and two air forces sharing those skies would need tight coordination. In 2024, Riyadh declared it would let nobody use Saudi skies for offensive operations.
Politics matters even more. Striking alone casts Israel as an outsider meddling in an Arab war. Striking with Riyadh’s blessing casts it as a partner.
Why is the crown prince saying no?
Mohammed bin Salman faces a hard calculation. Anger over Gaza still runs deep across the Arab world, and an open alliance with Israel would hand the Houthis a propaganda gift: they already cast their war as resistance to Saudi and Israeli aggression.
He also fears escalation, since Israeli jets over Yemen could provoke Iranian retaliation against Saudi oil facilities. Israel’s army chief, Lt Gen Eyal Zamir, shares that worry. He warned Washington that Israeli strikes could widen the war and even delay Israel’s election.
Expect quiet cooperation, not open combat, for now. Intelligence will keep flowing through CENTCOM, and Israel may share air-defence expertise as Saudi interceptor stocks dwindle. Overt Israeli strikes look unlikely before Israelis vote.
Two developments could change that: a Houthi strike that kills many more Saudis could force the crown prince’s hand, as could a Houthi move to close Bab al-Mandab entirely.
Either way, the Houthis have achieved something remarkable. They have pushed Israel and Saudi Arabia into closer military contact than ever, and whether that contact becomes an alliance now depends on one man in Riyadh.
